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III. JURISDICTIONAL BASIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The date of the order appealed from in this case is November 1, 1986 The notice of
appeal was filed on November 27, 1986

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter

pursuant to U C A § 78-2a-3(2)(h)
A post-judgment Rule 60(b) motion was heard June 17, 1997 and was orally denied The
order denying the motion has not yet been executed or filed by the trial court, and therefore is not,
at this juncture, part of this appeal
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue # 1 Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to the Appellee
under the standard announced in Jones v Jones. 700 P 2d 1072 (Utah 1985) and the statutory
standards of U C A § 30-3-5(7)
"[A] trial court's award of alimony is reviewed for clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion " Endrodvv Endrody. 914 P 2d 1166, 1168-1169 (Utah App 1996) (citation •
omitted ) The issue was raised in pages 2-3 of the memorandum filed by counsel for Appellant,
Eldon Eliason, when he objected to the Appellee's motion to amend the earlier order of the court
which had not awarded alimony The denial of alimony was also addressed in Intervener's
Objection to Amend the Findings on page 6, which were concurred in by the Appellant by his
counsel in the objection filed on March 29, 1996, page 4, paragraph 14
Issue # 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it assessed a judgment against the
Appellee in favor of the Appellant in the amount of $ 20,256 72, which was a payment of
Appellee's pre-martial obligation to the I R S 9

4

"[T]he trial court's property division is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."
Endrodv v. Endrody. 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-1169 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted).
Objections to the inclusion of an independent judgment for an I.R.S. obligation were
specifically raised in the arguments of the Intervenors in response to the Appellee's Motion to
Amend the Findings and Decree (part A, pages 4-5), which were concurred in by the Appellant by
his counsel in the objection filed on March 29, 1996, page 4, paragraph 14.
Issue # 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it entered a judgment against the
Appellee in favor of the Appellant in the amount of $ 20,256.72, when the legal conclusion does
not comport with the Findings of Fact made by the trial court?
If "a trial court should make findings of fact necessarily inconsistent with each other, such
action would be capricious and . . . such inconsistent findings would not be permitted to stand."
Malstrom v. Consolidated Theaters. 290 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 1955).
An objection to the form and nature of the orders entered by the trial court from which an
appeal are taken need not be raised before the trial court when such orders are prepared by the
Appellee's counsel; in the alternative, if the pleadings are improper, and were prepared by the
Appellee's counsel, then the inconsistent findings are to be stricken, along with the legal
conclusion.
V. Dispositive Legal Citations
Dispositive legal citations in this case include the following:
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1): "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in its
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties:
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h): "Alimony may not be ordered for duration longer than the number
5

of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court
finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time "
VI. Statement of the Case
After living together for approximately two years in California, (Transcript, page 115,
lines 12-15), the Plaintiff-Appellee wife and Defendant-Appellant husband were married in
California on October 24, 1987 (Transcript page 19, line 23 ) In December of 1987, the parties
mortgaged what had been a pre-martial home of the Plaintiff, (which home had been placed in the
name of both parties) (Amended Decree, U 8, page 3 ) While some monies were used for points,
adding on to the home, and for an eventual down payment on a farm in Utah, the majority of the
funds were used to pay a premarital I R S debt of the Defendant (Id ) The Defendant had not
participated in making house payments until he was married (Id , page 115, lines 18-23) When
working for Hughes or Quaker Oats, Appellant gave all of his salary to the Appellee which she
administered as she thought best, (Id , page 116, line 7 - page 117, line 15), from a joint bank
account (Id , page 31, lines 20-25), he relying on the community property provisions of the state
of California (Id , page 117, lines 14-18) One-half of the house payment was greater than the
rent he would have been paying elsewhere (Id , page 117, line 19 - page 118, line 2 ) He also
worked on the home, including placing on a redwood deck (Id , page 118, lines 3-4) In May
1990, the Appellee and Appellant purchased a 70 acre farm in Delta, Utah (Amended Findings, U
11)

The parties separated in June of 1994 (Id at U 19 ) Trial was held on October 13, 1995
During the trial, the trial Court reviewed an issue regarding the payment of a pre-marital

I R S obligation of Appellant In the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Court found that an I R S obligations of the Appellant incurred prior to their marriage was not
6

commingled with the property of the parties. The amount of the obligation was $ 20,256.72.
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 3-4, % 8.) Thereafter, however, the
trial court found that the Appellant's I R S . obligations relative to the Appellee were "one-half of
which amount defendant may retain and one-half which the plaintiff shall receive, in the amount of
$ 10,128.36." (Id., page 8, U 25.) Thereafter this Court concluded that the "Plaintiff is entitled to
judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $ 20,256.72 which was paid by the plaintiff to
satisfy the defendant's debt with the I.R.S." (Id. at page 10, U 39.) The Amended Decree
awarded judgment to the Plaintiff against the Defendant for $ 20,256.72. (Amended Decree, page
3, ^f 11.) The property distribution arising out of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law is properly summarized as follows:
Appellee

Appellant

Interveners

Assets
Sutherland Home

$36,250

Farm

$ 20,780

Water Payment
from Defendant

$ 9,203

Melville
Water

$ 27,900

Melville
Water $27,900

$ 10.920

Applt.
to Pay $ 2.700

Deseret
Water
Payment from
Interveners

$ 4,500

Deseret Water
Shares

$

Judgment for
I R S . Gift

728

$ 20.256
$70,937

$59,600

Debts

7

$30,600

•/2l992I.R.S.Debt

$

.350

Suther. Hm.
Loan
$25,000

Rental
Costs $ 4.500

Water
Liability $ 2,700
Water
Liability $ 9,203
Marital
Debts $ 2,600
Judg.
for IRS.
Gift
$ 20,256
Vi 1992
IRS.
Debt
$
NET PROPERTY

$

350

350
$60.109

$ 70.587

(— $

509)

$ 4.500
$26.100

(The valuations of the home, farm, and water are taken from the Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, page 6, ^ 19; the intervenor's obligation of $ 4,500.00 to Appellee is found
in id, page 4, \ 9; intervenor's loans to the parties in the amount of f$ 2,700.00 is found in id.,
page 6, U 17; page 10, % 5; the joint IRS tax liability for 1992 is found in id., page 11, Tf 40; the
payment to the Appellee for the water stock in the amount of $ 9,203.36 is taken from the Decree
of Divorce, page 2, paragraph 4).
The trial court also found that the Appellee received $ 229.00 in a monthly pension benefit
and $ 799.900 in monthly social security disability benefits, for a total monthly income of
$ 1,028.50. Defendant had $ 736.67 income imputed to him. (Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, page 2, % 5.) Alimony of $ 175.00 per month was awarded in favor of

8

Appellee (Id ) Paragraph 7 b of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Decree did not designate when the alimony was to terminate or any
extenuating circumstances that justified an award of the same beyond the time period of the
marriage
VII. Summary of the Arguments
The trial court's award of alimony clearly abused its discretion when it failed to consider
the binding standards articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jones v Jones l
The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to properly take into account the "ability
of the husband to provide support "2 The trial court also failed to follow the statutory
requirements of U C A § 30-3-5(7)(h) in awarding alimony for an unlimited time

The Court

also abused its discretion in (1) awarding a judgment for a pre-marital debt of the Appellant paid,
in part, by Appellee, almost eight years before the decree was entered and (2) entering a judgment
that did not comport with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
VIII. Argument
A. The Award of Alimony Was Clearly An Abuse of Discretion
The trial court found that Appellee had monthly income of $ 1, 028.50 and Appellant had
imputed monthly income of $ 746 67 When the alimony ordered by the Court is taken into
account, the monthly income of the Plaintiff-wife becomes $ 1,203.50 and that of the Defendanthusband becomes $ 571 67

If a minimum debt service of $ 300 00 per month secured by the

Melville water stock (on which Appellant has already received a cash payment for her portion) is

1

7 0 0 P 2 d 1072 (Utah 1985)

2

Id at 1075
9

made, the imputed income of Appellant is lessened to $ 271.67. The payment of rent by
Appellant in the amount of $ 150.00 per month (Transcript, page 77, lines 17-22) would leave the
Appellant with $ 121.67 for all of the personal living expenses as well as other debt service
imposed by the trial court. Awarding alimony under these circumstance failed to take into account
the financial situation of the Appellant as required by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jones
v. Jones. The property settlement and debt obligations of parties do not justify a different result.
When the division of property is completely resolved, the property interests balance as follows:
Appellee receives $ 70,587.00, Appellant receives a negative $509, and Intervenors receive
$ 26,100.00. (In the event that Intervenors are granted additional relief, the disparity will
increase.) For all of the foregoing, it was an abuse of discretion to award alimony under the facts
of this case.

|

Even if any award of alimony is proper, the provisions of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) provide
that "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time."
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Decree did not designate when the alimony was to terminate or any
extenuating circumstances. As the Decree does not comply with the statutory requirements,
Appellant should be relieved of that effect of the judgment until it is corrected in accordance with
law.
B. Awarding Appellee the "IRS Judgment" Was An Abuse of Discretion
During the trial, the trial court reviewed an issue regarding the payment of a pre-marital
I R S . obligation of Defendant Boyd E. Broderick. In the Amended Findings of Fact and
10

Conclusions of Law, the Court found that this payment was to be divided between the parties
"one-half of which amount defendant may retain and one-half which the plaintiff shall receive, in
the amount of $ 10,128 36 " (Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 8, f 25 )
Thereafter this Court concluded that the "Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant in
the amount of $ 20,256 72 which was paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the defendant's debt with the
I R S " (Id at page 10, ^ 39 ) The Amended Decree awarded judgment to the Plaintiff against
the Defendant for $ 20,256 72 (Amended Decree, page 3, % 11 ) The amount of the judgment is
in error for at least three reasons
First, having already found in paragraph 25 of the findings that one-half of the I.R.S debt
could be retained by the Appellant, or $ 10,128 36, an award of $ 20,256.72 against the
Appellant as a judgment for the entire I R S payment is in error. "The importance of complete,
accurate and consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of
dispute under the proper rule of law " Smithy Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Indeed, if
"a trial court should make findings of fact necessarily inconsistent with each other, such action
would be capricious and that such inconsistent findings would not be permitted to stand "
Malstrom v Consolidated Theaters. 4 Utah2d 181, 290 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 1955)
Second, assigning the Appellant total liability for the I R.S debt is an abuse of discretion
when no evidence exists to contradict that the payment had been a gift or other non-liability
situation from one spouse to the other * Had there been any intent to hold the Appellant liable for

3

This concept follows the standard used in evaluating gifts and exchanges of inherited or
other property between spouses who later divorce Osguthorpev Osguthorpe. 804 P.2d 530,
535 (Utah App 1990), citing Mortensen v Mortensen. 760 P 2d 304, 308(Utah 1988) (Emphasis
added ) See also Willevv Willev. 866 P.2d 547, 555 (Utah App 1993).
11

the LR.S. obligation, it could easily have been included in a pre-marital or post-marital agreement4
or some other evidence of intent to hold a party liable for a paid debt in the event of a divorce.
Third, for the significant disparity of property division, and the fact that the Appellant
I
contributed all of his salary during the marriage to the family checking account in reliance on the
marriage relationship,5 it is inequitable under the doctrine of equitable estoppel (as raised in
Appellant's answer) to now impose liability on him for this newly created, inequitable obligation
arising from conduct over nine years before. There was no evidence introduced indicating that at
the time of the payment of the I R S . obligation there was a contemporaneous understanding or
attempt by the Appellee to hold the Appellant liable for the debt or that there was any intent to
preserve the payment as an asset of the Appellee.
Thus, regardless of the theory used, awarding an independent judgment for the entire
amount of the payment made for Appellant's pre-marital LR.S. obligation does not follow
"logically from, [nor] is supported by the evidence and controlling legal principles [or equity]."
Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).
IX: Conclusion
4

Matter of Estate of Beesley. 883 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1994).

5

Transcript, pages 115-118, pointing out that he had lived there for two years before the
marriage without making house payments (page 115, lines 11-20), did not participate in making
house payments until he was married (page 115, lines 18-23), and when working for Hughes or
Quaker Oats, gave all of his salary to the Plaintiff which she administered as she thought best,
(page 116, line 7 - page 117, line 15), from a joint bank account (page 31, lines 20-25), he
relying on the community property provisions of the state of California (page 117, lines 14-18),
which payment was greater than the rent he would have been paying elsewhere (page 117, line 19
- page 118, line 2.) Having made such payments, and worked on the home, including placing on a
redwood deck (page 118, lines 3-4), because of the marital relationship, the Plaintiff may not now
ignore the marriage relationship to regain a gift she made over nine years ago as part of that
relationship.
12

The trial court abused its discretion in determining to award alimony to Appellee as well
as an judgment for a pre-marital I R S obligation of the Appellant In awarding alimony, the trial
court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to consider the binding standards articulated in
the case of Jones v Jones. 6 wherein the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed three factors that must
be considered when making an award of alimony The trial court clearly abused its discretion
when it failed to properly take into account the "ability of the husband to provide support " 7 The
trial court also failed to follow the statutory requirements of U C A § 30-3-5(7)(h) in awarding
alimony for an unlimited time
The trial court further abused its discretion in (1) awarding a judgment for a pre-marital
debt of the Appellant paid, in part, by Appellee, almost nine years before the decree was entered
and (2) entering a judgment that did not comport with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law
X: Addendum
The following documents are included with Appellants' Opening brief as an Addendum
1 Amended Decree of Divorce dated October 31, 1996, filed November 1, 1996
2 Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions and Law, dated October 31, 1996, filed
November 1, 1996
3 Notice of Appeal dated November 27, 1996, filed November 27, 1996
4 Transcript of Trial, pages 1, 19, 77, 115-118
5 Objection to Motion to Proposed Finding, Memorandum and Closing Argument

6

700 P 2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

7

Id at 1075
13

from Appellants' Counsel, pages 1-4.
6. Objection to Motion to Amend, etc., Interveners, pages 1, 5-6
DATED this 24,h day of June, 1997.
MATTHEW HILTON, PC.

?h^n/^i.

/Jc.iJ<-*. k<,i^.M

Matthew Hilton
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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PJ,

JU^Or.

DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile. (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,825

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE D. BRODERICK,
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 944401066
Judge Guy R. Burningham

BOYD E. BRODERICK,
Defendant.

ALMA L. BRODERICK and
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK,
Intervenors.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on October 13, 1995. The plaintiff
was present and represented by her attorney, Don R. Petersen of Howard, Lewis & Petersen;
the defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Eldon A. Eliason; and the intervenors
were present and represented by their attorney, Paul D. Lyman. The Court heard testimony,
received evidence, reviewed the file, and issued a Memorandum Decision dated January 16,

1996. The Court notes the motion to amend filed by the plaintiff and the objections filed by the
intervenors and entered its ruling on August 13, 1996. The Court notes that Rule 8 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that all pleadings shall be so construed to do substantial
justice. The Court having heretofore entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and being fully advised in the premises, makes and enters the following:
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Plaintiff is hereby granted a decree of divorce divorcing her from the defendant

on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2.

Plaintiff is hereby restored her surname of "Drikas."

3.

Plaintiff and defendant are hereby awarded the personal property now in their

respective possession, except that defendant is awarded the parrot and porcelain doll now in
plaintiffs possession. Defendant is also awarded the manuscript signed by President Grover
Cleveland if and when plaintiff finds it.
I
4.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the Sutherland home, without any encumbrances,

and $9,203.36, secured by her one-fourth interest in the Melville Irrigation water stock. If
defendant fails to remit the $9,203.36 amount to plaintiff within six (6) months from the Court's
signing the decree, plaintiff is granted the right to foreclose on the water stock.
5.

Plaintiff shall assume none of the marital debts. Defendant's name shall be

removed from the deed to the Sutherland home.

2

6.

Defendant is hereby awarded the farm, the 62 shares of Melville Irrigation

water stock subject to plaintiffs one-fourth interest, and the 30 shares of Deseret water stock.
7.

Defendant is ordered to assume the $25,000.00 debt secured by the water stock,

the $2,700.00 debt owed to intervenors for their loan to make payments on the Sutherland home,
the Plus One Plumbing debt in the amount of $900.00, the First Security Visa debt in the
amount of $1,000.00, and the Zions Bank Visa debt in the amount of $700.00. In addition,
plaintiffs name shall be removed from the certificates for water stock, upon defendant's
satisfying the $9,203.36 award to plaintiff; from the deed to the farm; from the Plus One
Plumbing account; from the First Security Visa account and from the Zions Bank Visa account.
8.

Intervenors shall retain their one-half interest in the 62 shares of Melville

Irrigation water stock.
9.

All parties, including intervenors, shall pay their own attorney fees.

10.

Plaintiff is awarded alimony in the amount of $175.00 per month retroactive

to February 28, 1996. Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff $175.00 per month on the
28th day of each month until such time as the plaintiff may remarry, co-habitate or otherwise
legally not be entitled to the same.
11.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant in the amount of

$20,256.72, which is the amount the plaintiff paid towards the defendant's obligation to the
Internal Revenue Service.

3

12.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the intervenors Alma L. Broderick and

Sephronia L. Broderick in the amount of $4,500.00 for delinquent rent.
13.

Plaintiff is awarded two shares of Deseret water stock, subject to any loan

wherein the stock is used as collateral. The loan should be repaid as ordered by the Court and
two shares of Deseret water stock are to then be released and transferred to the plaintiff.
DATED this ? /

day of September, 1996.
BY THE COURT

•£&

iURNINGHAM
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE'

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

PAUL D. LYMAN, ESQ.
Attorney for Intervenors

ELDON A. ELIASON, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant

4

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

TO:

PAUL D. LYMAN, ESQ. and ELDON A. ELIASON, ESQ.:

You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for plaintiff, will submit the
above and foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce to the Honorable Guy R. Burningham for his
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days
for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the
Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah.
DATED this

day of September, 1996.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

day of September, 1996.

Paul D. Lyman, Esq.
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, UT 84701
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COPY
•' FIL^D
Matthew Hilton (A3655)
MATTHEW HILTON, PC.
197 South Main Street # 1
P.O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
Telephone: 801-489-1111
Facsimile: 801-489-6000

v,

, ^. t4

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—oooOooo—
ELAINE D. BRODERICK,
Plaintiff-Appellee.

: MAILING CERTIFICATE

vs.
BOYD E. BRODERICK,
Defendant-Appellant.

: Civil No. 960775

ALMA L. BRODERICK and
SEPHRONIA L BRODERICK,
Interveners and
Appellants
I
—oooOooo—
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of June 1997 I placed in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, first class, a copy of the document entitled APPELLANT'S
OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL filed in this case, to the following counsel of record:
Paul D. Lyman, Esq.
835 East 300 North #100
Richfield, UT 84701
1

Don R. Petersen, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
DATED this 24th day of June, 1997.

Matthew Hilton, Attorney at Law
Attorney for Appellant Boyd Broderick

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

On the 24th day of June, 1997, Matthew Hilton appeared before me and swore
under oath and penalty of perjury that he had signed the foregoing mailing certificate
and that the statements contained therein were true.
DATED this 24th day of June 1997.

h.
/;

Notary Public
JEANNE M.LEVIE
I
825 West 2000 North
Mapieton, Utah 84664 |
My Commission Expires i
September 30. 2000
I
State of Utah
J

*L> H. L

TARY PUBLIC

2

A :- ^ -

Eldon A. Eliason, Esq.
P. 0 . Box 605
Delta, UT 84624

fyl^yUt

SECRETARY

J:\DRP\BRODRCK.DEC
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;
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DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,825

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE D. BRODERICK,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 94401066DA
Judge Guy R. Burningham

vs.
BOYD E. BRODERICK,
Defendant.
ALMA L. BRODERICK and
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK,
Intervenors.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on October 13, 1995. The plaintiff
was present and represented by her attorney, Don R. Petersen of Howard, Lewis & Petersen;
the defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Eldon A. Eliason; the intervenors
were present and represented by their attorney, Paul D. Lyman. The Court heard testimony,
received evidence, reviewed the file, issued a Memorandum Decision dated January 16, 1996,

received the plaintiffs Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce, together with accompanying memoranda of the parties; and the Court having issued
its ruling on said Motion to Amend on August 13, 1996, and being fully advised in the premises,
it now makes and enters the following:
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and defendant are, and have been, residents of Millard County, State

of Utah, for three months prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on October 24, 1987, and are currently

wife and husband, respectively,
I
3.

No children were born of this marriage and none are expected.

4.

During the course of the marriage, the parties experienced irreconcilable

differences making it impossible for them to continue their marriage relationship.
5.

Plaintiff is currently disabled and receives a $229.50 monthly pension benefit

and a $799.00 monthly social security disability benefit, for a total monthly income of
$1,028.50. Defendant shall have a monthly income of $736.67 imputed to him.
6.

Prior to the parties' marriage, the plaintiff owned a home in Southgate,

California, subject to a mortgage. The home owned by the plaintiff in Southgate, California at
the time of the marriage of the parties had a value of $110,000.00, subject to a mortgage of
$59,000.00.
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7.

Upon careful consideration of the case law and Utah statute, it appears that

reversible error has occurred with this Court's present lack of sufficient findings regarding
alimony. Upon consideration of the four factors outlined in § 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, the Court makes the following findings:
a.

That the plaintiff is currently disabled and has ongoing needs which this

Court was unable to provide for in the property division already made.
b.

That the defendant is able-bodied and able to provide alimony to the

plaintiff in the amount of $175.00 per month, which amount is reasonable to assist the plaintiff
in her ongoing needs. This alimony should be retroactive to the date of the Decree of Divorce,
February 28, 1996. Due to the duration of this marriage, the alimony is permanent until such
time as the plaintiff may remarry, co-habitate or otherwise legally not be entitled to the same.
8.

In December, 1987, the parties refinanced the Southgate, California home to

borrow an additional sum of $30,000.00. From that amount, the parties paid $20,256.72 to the
Internal Revenue Service to pay defendant's tax debt, $2,900.00 to remodel the Southgate home,
and $3,343.28 as a down payment on a home in Delta, Utah. These debts and assets were all
commingled, with the exception of defendant's tax debt. Defendant's name was put on the home
in Southgate, California because of the debt he had with the Internal Revenue Service, as set
forth in paragraph 7 above in the amount of $20,256.72. The home was refinanced to pay off
the defendant's tax debt. The only reason the defendant's name was put on the home in
Southgate, California was to pay off a debt that he had incurred prior to marrying the plaintiff.
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It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be reimbursed for the $20,256.72 which was used
from the plaintiffs home which she owned prior to her marrying the defendant to pay off the
defendant's debt which was incurred prior to their marriage.
9.
1972.

Intervenors, who are defendant's parents, purchased a home in Delta, Utah in

Intervenors sold this home to plaintiff and defendant on September 6, 1988 for

$15,000.00. Plaintiff and defendant paid $6,500.00 as a down payment--$3,343.28 from the
refinancing of the Southgate home and $3,156.72 from their earnings-and for the remainder
they obligated themselves for monthly payments in the amount of $300.00. Alma L. Broderick,
one of the intervenors, entered into a written contract with the plaintiff and defendant to rent the
plaintiff and defendant's home located in Delta, Utah, for the sum of $250.00 per month. There
is owed the sum of $9,000.00, which is calculated from February, 1989, to January, 1993. It
is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be granted judgement against the intervenors Alma L.
Broderick and Sephronia L. Broderick in the amount of $4,500.00 for delinquent rent.
10.

In January, 1993, plaintiff and defendant deeded the Delta home back to

intervenors in exchange for $15,000.00:

$3,500.00 truck value, $2,000.00 loan in 1992,

$9,000.00 cash, and $500.00 reduction in price.
11.

In May, 1990, plaintiff and defendant purchased a 70-acre farm near Delta,

Utah, together with 62 shares of Melville Irrigation water stock and 30 shares of Deseret water
stock, for $66,389.28.

Plaintiff and defendant paid $12,859.28 as a down payment and

obligated themselves for monthly payments of $775.47. Of the $12,859.28 down payment,
4

plaintiffs parents contributed $5,000.00 as a gift to plaintiff, and intervenors contributed
$7,859.28 as a loan to plaintiff and defendant.
12.

Plaintiff and defendant are the joint-tenant owners of record on the farm

property. Plaintiff, defendant and intervenors are the joint-tenant owners of the 62 shares of
Melville Irrigation water stock. Intervenors' names were placed on the water stock certificate
to secure repayment of their $7,859.28 loan to plaintiff and defendant and for the bank's added
security on the farm loan.
13.

Plaintiff and defendant made the monthly payments until September, 1991,

when intervenors began managing the farm and making the monthly payments. In addition,
intervenors reaped the benefits of managing the farm and of making the payments.
14.

In March, 1993, the Southgate, California home finally sold for $150,000.00.

Plaintiff and defendant received a net sum of $52,413.04. Of the net proceeds, plaintiff and
defendant paid $36,390.04 to retire their farm mortgage obligation; plaintiff and defendant used
the remaining $16,023.00 for living and farm expenses.
15.

On June 4, 1993, plaintiff and defendant purchased a home in the Sutherland

area for $27,000.00. Zions Bank loaned them the purchase money, secured by the Melville
Irrigation and Deseret water stocks. The monthly payments are $300.00.

The remaining

obligation is about $25,000.00.
16.

Plaintiff and defendant made the monthly payments on the Sutherland home

through June, 1994, except that intervenors made the March, 1994, payment. Plaintiff made
5

the monthly payments from July, 1994, to January, 1995.

Intervenors made the monthly

payments from February, 1995, to October, 1995.
17.

Plaintiffs payments total $2,100.00; intervenors' payments total $3,000.00:

the February, 1995, to October, 1995 payments amounted to a $2,700.00 loan to plaintiff and
defendant; the March, 1994 payment amounted to a gift to plaintiff and defendant.
18.

Plaintiff and defendant separated in June, 1994; plaintiff has lived alone in the

Sutherland home since the separation.
19.

The average appraised value of the farm with water stock is $87,500.00: 70

acres of land is $20,780.00, 62 shares of Melville Irrigation water stock at $900.00 per share
is $55,800.00, and 30 shares of Deseret water stock at an average price of $364.00 is
$10,920.00, for a total water stock value of $66,720.00. The average appraised value of the
Sutherland home is $36,250.00.
20.

Intervenors' assets relating to this matter include their one-half interest in the

Melville Irrigation water stock, valued at $27,900.00. The $2,700.00 loan to plaintiff and
defendant for nine monthly payments of $300.00 each towards the Sutherland home, and the
$7,859.28 loan to plaintiff and defendant for the down payment on the farm, are not actual debts
of plaintiff and defendant, in that intervenors have their interest in the Melville Irrigation water
stock with a value significantly greater than the loan amounts.

Therefore, the value of

intervenors' total interest relating to this matter is $27,900.00, which creates a significant
windfall to intervenors.
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21.

The value of the Sutherland home plus the value of the farm with water stock

is $123,750.00. By subtracting out interveners' interest, plaintiff and defendant have interests
valued together at $95,850.00.
22.

Plaintiffs assets include a one-fourth interest in the Melville Irrigation water

stock, valued at $13,950.00; a one-half interest in the Deseret water stock, valued at $5,460.00;
$5,000.00 of equity in the farm, derived from a gift from her parents and used in the down
payment; a one-half interest in the farm, after subtracting her $5,000.00 down payment, valued
at $7,890.00; a one-half interest in the Sutherland home, valued at $18,125.00; one-half of a
debt owed by defendant to the community for the community's payment of his separate tax debt,
in the amount of $10,128.36; a debt owed by defendant for his share of seven monthly payments
plaintiff made alone, valued at $1,050.00. Plaintiffs total asset value is $61,603.36.
23.

Plaintiffs debts include one-half of the obligation to Zions Bank for the

Sutherland home, in the amount of $12,500.00; one-half of the obligation owed to intervenors
for nine $300.00 mortgage payments relating to the Sutherland home, in the amount of
$1,350.00; one-half of the First Security Visa debt, in the amount of $500.00; one-half of the
Zions Bank Visa debt, in the amount of $350.00; one-half of the Plus One Plumbing debt, in
the amount of $450.00. Plaintiffs share of the marital obligations is $15,150.00.
24.

Defendant's assets include a one-fourth interest in the Melville Irrigation water

stock, valued at $13,950.00; a one-half interest in the Deseret water stock, valued at $5,460.00;
a one-half interest in the farm, after subtracting plaintiffs $5,000.00 down payment, valued at
7

$7,890.00; a one-half interest in the Sutherland home, valued at $18,125.00. Defendant's total
asset value is $45,425.00.
25.

Defendant's debts include one-half of the obligation to Zions Bank for the

Sutherland home, in the amount of $12,500.00; one-half of the obligation owed to intervenors
for nine $300.00 mortgage payments relating to the Sutherland home, in the amount of
$1,350.00; one-half of the First Security Visa debt, in the amount of $500.00; one-half of the
Zions Bank Visa debt, in the amount of $350.00; one-half of the Plus One Plumbing debt, in
the amount of $450.00; one-half of the seven $300.00 payments plaintiff paid on the Sutherland
home, in the amount of $1,050.00; a debt owed by defendant to the marital estate for its
$20,256.72 payment of his separate tax debt, one-half of which amount defendant may retain
and one-half of which plaintiff shall receive, in the amount of $10,128.36. Defendant's share
of the marital obligations is $26,328.36.
26.

Intervenors' assets relating to this matter have a net value of $27,900.00.

Plaintiff has a net value, i.e., after subtracting debt value from asset value, of $45,453.36.
Defendant has a net value of $19,096.64.
27.

The parties own two shares of Deseret water stock which came with the

purchase of the Sutherland home, which stock should be awarded to the plaintiff, subject,
however, to the pledge of the shares as collateral on the loan. The loan should still be repaid
as already ordered, and when the two shares are released, they should be transferred to the
plaintiff.
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28.

Plaintiff and defendant are indebted to the Internal Revenue Service for taxes

incurred for the year 1992 in the approximate amount of $700.00. This was an obligation
incurred while the parties were living together. The plaintiff was unemployed; the defendant
was employed and working. It is reasonable and proper that both the plaintiff and defendant
equally share this obligation.
From the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
29.

Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce divorcing her from defendant on the

grounds of irreconcilable differences.
30.

Plaintiff may restore her surname to "Drikas."

31.

Plaintiff and defendant shall be awarded personal property now in their

respective possession, except that defendant shall be awarded the parrot and porcelain doll now
in plaintiffs possession. Defendant shall also be awarded the manuscript signed by President
Grover Cleveland if and when plaintiff finds it.
32.

Plaintiff shall be awarded the Sutherland home, without any encumbrances, and

$9,203.36, secured by her one-fourth interest in the Melville Irrigation water stock. If defendant
fails to remit the $9,203.36 amount to plaintiff within six (6) months from the Court's signing
the decree, plaintiff shall have the right to foreclose on the water stock.
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33.

Plaintiff shall assume none of the marital debts. Defendant's name shall be

removed from the deed to the Sutherland home.
34.

Defendant shall be awarded the farm, the 62 shares of Melville Irrigation water

stock subject to plaintiffs one-fourth interest, and the 30 shares of Deseret water stock.
35.

Defendant shall assume the $25,000.00 debt secured by the water stock, the

$2,700.00 debt owed to intervenors for their loan to make payments on the Sutherland home,
the Plus One Plumbing debt in the amount of $900.00, the First Security Visa debt in the
amount of $1,000.00, and the Zions Bank Visa debt in the amount of $700.00. In addition,
plaintiffs name shall be removed from the certificates for water stock, upon defendant's
satisfying the $9,203.36 award to plaintiff; from the deed to the farm; from the Plus One
Plumbing account; from the First Security Visa account and from the Zions Bank Visa account.
36.

Intervenors shall retain their one-half interest in the 62 shares of Melville

Irrigation water stock.
37.

All parties, including intervenors, shall pay their own attorney fees.

38.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony and the defendant should pay to her

the sum of $175.00 per month from February 28, 1996. This sum should be paid on the 28th
day of each month, until such time as the plaintiff may remarry, co-habitate, or otherwise legally
not be entitled to the same.
39.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the amount of

$20,256.72 which was paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the defendant's debt with the IRS.
10

40.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant should equally share the obligation owed

to the IRS for the tax year 1992.
DATED this %/

day of September, 1996.
BY THE COURT

R. 'BURMNGHAM
DISTRICT COURT JUDG*

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

PAULD. LYMAN, ESQ.
Attorney for Interveners

ELDON A. ELIASON, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL

TO:

PAUL D. LYMAN, ESQ. and ELDON A. ELIASON, ESQ.:

You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for plaintiff, will submit the
above and foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce to the Honorable Guy R. Bumingham for his
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days
for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the
Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah.
DATED this <>

day of September, 1996.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

day of September, 1996.

Paul D. Lyman, Esq.
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, UT 84701
Eldon A. Eliason, Esq.
P. O. Box 605
Delta, UT 84624

/ >U*m*
SECRETARY

J\DRP\BRODRCK.FOF
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/ 2 1996
MILLARD COUNTY

Matthew Hilton (A3655)
MATTHEW HILTON, PC.
197 South Main Street # 1
P.O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

ELAINE D. BRODERICK,
Plaintiff-Appellee.

: NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
Civil No. 94W366-DA

BOYD E. BRODERICK,
Defendant-Appellant.

Judge Guy R. Burningham
ALMA L. BRODERICK and
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK,
Intervenors and
Appellants
—oooOooo—

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant and Apellant, Boyd E. Broderick,
through his counsel, Matthew Hilton of MATTHEW HILTON, P.C., hereby appeals the final
judgment entitled Amended Decree of Divorce entered November 1, 1996, by the Honorable
Judge Guy R. Burningham of the Fourth District Court, Millard County, to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment with the exception of the granting of the
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divorce
DATED this 27,h day of November, 1996
MATTHEW HILTON, P C

illlffei^/JL.,
Matthew Hilton
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
BoydE Broderick

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, MILLARD COUNTY
Vi \

ELAINE BRODERICK,

is?" V ^

Plaintiff,

rv

Case No. 94401066

VS.

BOYD BRODERICK,
Defendant.

Preliminary Hearing
Electronically recorded on
October 13, 1995
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GUY R. BURNIN6HAM
Fourth District.Court Judge
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
(Elaine Broderick)

DON PETERSEN
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)373-6345

For the Defendant:
(Boyd Broderick)

ELDEN ELIASON

For the Interveners:
(A. L. Broderick)

PAUL D. LYMAN
835 East 300 North
Suite 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801)896-2675

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT
CENTER COURT REPORTING
P. 0. BOX 1786
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786
TELEPHONE: (8 01)2 2 4-9847

Q.

Does your mother and father help you financially?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What do they do for you?

A.

I eat there so that I can, you know, make sure

that I h ave food.
In regards to your husband's health, how is his

Q.
health?
A.

As far as I know, fine.

Q.

Now, you were married in '87?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Where did you live?

A.

We lived in the house that I had previous to the

marriage

•

Q.

Where was that?

A.

10235 Walnut, Southgate, California.

Q.

Tell the Court where Southgate is.

A.

It's in the central area of Los Angeles.

South

central.
Q.

Were you buying the home at the time you married

the defendant?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, what day were you married?

A.

October 24th, '87.

Q.

Did you have occasion to refinance the home?

A.

Yes, we did.
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BOYD BRODERICK.
having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.

Would you state your name, please.

A.

Boyd Abel Broderick.

Q.

And you're the defendant in this action; are you

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Mr. Broderick, where do you reside?

A.

In Hinkley.

Q.

What is the address?

A.

500 West 900 North.

Q.

Who owns the property where you reside?

A.

My folks.

Q.

Are you paying any rent?

A.

A hundred and a half.

Q.

Do you pay that every month?

A.

Only when I can.

Q.

Have you been paying that regularly?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you recently inherited any property?

A.

Recently?

Q.

Well, have you inherited any property?

not?

77

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Let's get this straight.

Now, you got married in

'87, didn't you?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And it wasn't seven years that you lived there.

You moved to Utah, I think we determined, in 1992; did you
not?

So you lived there five years.
A.

(Inaudible)•

Q.

You have to answer audibly.

A.

Five years.

Q.

Well, your testimony was you lived there for

seven years, but you didn't live in that home for seven
years, did you?
A.

I lived with her just about not quite two years

before we got married.
Q.

Oh, I see.

So you say you moved in in '85?

A.

Not totally, but yeah, I was there.

Q.

Well, you weren't living there and making house

payments in 1985.
A.

No, I wasn't making house payments.

Q.

You didn't start participating in the house

payments until you got married, did you?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Okay.

You got married in 1987.

Now, you didn't

live in that house for seven years after you got married,
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did you?
A.

Pardon?

Q.

You did not live in that house for seven years

after you got married,
A.

It would be five years.

Q.

So it's five and not seven?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, when were you terminated by Hughes?

A.

I don't remember.

Q.

About 1990, wasn't it?

A.

I don't remember.

Q.

Now, you lived there for a period of time before

you moved to Utah; did you not, after you were terminated
by Hughes?
A.

In the house?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And after you were terminated by Hughes you made

no further -- you didn't make any money, so you didn't
make -A.

Yes, I did make money.

Q.

What did you do?

A.

I worked for Quaker Oats.

Q.

When did you terminate with them?

A.

The latter part of '92, I guess.

What month, I
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don't know.
Q.

So are you saying you lived there and made house

payments from '87 to '92?
A.

(Inaudible).

Q.

That's a yes?

A.

No, I'm guessing.

Q.

Your guessing?

A.

For positive, I can't tell you.

Q.

Now, you're saying that you paid half the house

payment and Mrs. Broderick paid the other half; is that
correct?
A.

No, what I'm saying is we put everything in the

kitty, and she made the checks, she paid the bills.
Q.

Okay, but my notes indicate under direct

examination you said you paid half the house payment.
A.
half.

Well, I just put everything half.
What's —

it's half and half, right?

What's hers is
Community

property.
Q.

Now, you'd have had to pay rent or something.

you weren't living there you would have paid somewhere
else; would you not?
A.

That's true.

Q.

You would have paid more than what you were

paying to live in that house; would you not?
A.

Not necessarily, no.
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If

Q.

You could have got by for less?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you have any evidence that you put $10,000 for

improvements?
A.

I put a 20-by-24 redwood deck outside.

Q.

I'm talking money.

A.

Do I have receipts?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

She's got the receipts.

Do you have cancelled checks?
She could produce all

the receipts.
Q.

So the $10,000 is just a guess; is it not?

A.

No, it's pretty close.

Real pretty close,

accurate.
Q.

But you don't have a cancelled check or a receipt

or anything like that with you?
A.

No, not on the (inaudible) because I don't have

the records.

She has all the records.

When I left I just

took my personal belongings and that was it.
Q.

You walked out on her; did you not?

She was sick

and that's when you walked out.
A.

Yes, I left.

Yes.

Q.

You did the same thing in Utah; did you not?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

When you dumped cookie dough on her head?

A.

No, I didn't.
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DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION

TO

o<

ELDON A ELIASON
Attorney for Defendant
Box 605 Delta, Utah 84624
(801) 864:2515

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELAINE BRODERICK

:

Plaintiff,

#

PROPOSED FINDING / MEMORANDUM
AND CLOSING ARGUEMENT

vs •
BOYD BRODERICK
Defendant
:

A.L. BRODERICK
and
MRS. A. L. BRODERICK

:

Intervenors

1

:

Defendant, through his legal counsel, registers

Objection in reply

his

to the proposed Findings and Conclusions

and represents that the same are not supported by the facts and
evidence submitted at the trial.
2 At the time Plaintiff Counsel submitted

his amended

findings and objection to the first set of findings adopted

from

the Court's ruling, defendant's counsel was in St. Mark's Hospital
for which he was confined for over two months with surgerical procedures.

Defendant's Counsel had reviewed Plaintiff's fiTst~ findings

and accepted them as copied from the Court's ruling.
3

It is represented to the Court that Plaintiff's

findings

now

are not supported by the evidence which was presented at the trial
and made part of the ruling.

Plaintiff, following her first marria-ge

was married to defendant a shorter time without apparent

change

in her circumstances.
4

She was domineering and aggressive.

He was passive and

submissive as evidenced by both direct testimony and cross examination.
to her.

He brought his paychecks home and delivered

She wrote the checks on the account.

lavishly, she did it.

marriage.

If they lived

She obtained credit cards at various

places including banks.
during the marriage.

them

He never signed for a credit card or check

He never used a credit card during the

She lived beyond their means.

He did not.

Her

aggressiveness was displayed in Court when she attempted to
shut down her mother's

testimony and was cautioned by the

Court.
5

Defendant is about 50 .yrsi of age. He does not have skills

that will enable him to obtain an adequate living.

On a short

second marriage with his limitations there is no justification
for alimony, and to impose it would tend to make him a victim
of charity or becomes subject to law enforcement for inability
to pay alimony.
6

A second husband has some obligation to his divorced

wife even if they, Boyd and Elaine, had no children and he did
not dissipate
ity

The law places certain responsibil-

on family and parents, including the previous husband of

Elaine's.
7

the estate.

Boyd was married to Elaine for only five years.

Defendant knows farming and can be a self-employed

farmer.

His parents have spent a considerable amount of money

in helping to acquire a farming
8

program.

Alimony is usually based on the following factors:

9
Utah Supreme Court has long held that once a court has
determined
that something is marital property, notwithstanding
name on title, the Court may distribute it equitably.
(Hoagland vs. Hoagland (852 P 2 1025)
The Court is empowered to make such distribution as is
just and equitable . (Jones vs. Jones (700 P21072)
2

The
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Court may consider,
Age of parties
Ability, training and education
Present income
Effect on welfare of supporting spouse and
receiving spouse
(e) Ability of supporting spouse to provide
supporting obligations imposed by the Court

10

The Court is required to base its ruling on the circum-

stances of each particular case, and Plaintiff testifed as
follows when asked about Boyd Broderick f s employment

in Utah:

"He received $4.50 per hour at the cheese plant."
"No one else will hire him."
11

Defendant came to Utah with prospects of a job to sub-

sidize his farming.

IFA (Intermountain Farmers) instead re-

quired him to take a competency examination
to another.

Defendant sought employment

and gave the job

from Brush Wellman,

Intermountain Power, Continental Lime, The Cement Plant,
McDonalds, to list a few-- all to no avail.

He tried to take

guard duty at Intermountain Power or cleanup work at McDonalds.'
This was known to his wife; and to represent to the Court or
infer to the Court he would not work, is grossly unfair.
12

It is also misleading to state or infer that

defendant

had no interest in the California home, when, infact, defendant
turned every one of his paychecks from five to seven years to
Elaine and she paid all the bills and kept all the receipts.
She paid the payments on the home with at least one-half of his
money.

She ran up credit card obligations of $30,000; and

passed it off by testifying Boyd had no credit card

transactions

because of his credit problem with Internal Revenue Service.
13

If we follow the proposed findings, the defendant will

be paying twice for his wife's spendings, and then be paying

3

alimony besides on an income less than his modest living expense.
He lives in a rented trailer on property not his own, industriously farming property which his parents have substantially
14

provided

Defendant concurs in objections and proposed amended

findings by Counsel for Intervenors.
Respectfully,

^

c

^r^gW
Eldon A. Eliason
Attorney for the Defendant
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Paul D. Lyman #4522
Attorney for Intervenors
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-2675
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DECREE OF DIVORCE
and
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION

ELAINE D. BRODERICK,
Plaintiff,
vs
BOYD E. BRODERICK,
Defendant.

Civil No. 94401066DA
Judge Guy R. Burningham

ALMA L. BRODERICK and
SEPHRONIAL. BRODERICK,
Intervenors

OBJECTION
COME NOW the Intervenors and Object to the Plaintiff's Motion
to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.
The motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(e) and must be based upon one or
more of the grounds stated in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

No grounds are set forth.

As is more fully explained in the accompanying Memorandum, the
Plaintiff is simply trying to reargue the entire case.

Her motion

should be denied.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This matter came on for trial on October-13, 1995.

The

I
.CLERK |
CEPUP/
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Plaintiff, the Defendant and the Intervenors were all present and
represented by counsel. After a full day of testimony and numerous
exhibits were received, the Court took this matter under advisement. On
January 16, 1996, the Court issued an extensive Memorandum Decision
going point by point through the evidence and making the necessary
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. A set of Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were prepared by the
Plaintiff's attorney, signed by the Court and entered by the clerk.
The Plaintiff has now filed a Motion to Amend.

CONTROLLING RULE
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in
pertinent part the following:
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule
61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has
been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a
new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of
the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion
by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
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(2) Misconduct of the jury; and
whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general
or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, •
by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct
may be proved by the affidavit of any one
of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence,
material for the party making the
application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the veridct or other decision, or
that' it is against law.
(7)

Error in Law.

(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than 10 days after the
entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the
application for a new trial is made under
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4) , it shall be
supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to
alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10
days after entry of the judgment.

Page 4--Objection to Motion to Amend
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce and Memorandum in
Support of Objection
Elaine D. Broderick v. Boyd E. Broderick
Alma L. Broderick and Sephronia L. Broderick, Intervenors
ARGUMENT
Rule 59 provides a clear cut process for a party to seek
relief short of an appeal in trials without a jury.

It requires the

moving party to base its motion on one or more of the grounds stated in
Subdivision (a). Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P.2d
309, 311 (Utah 1979).
The first four itemized grounds must be supported by an
accompanying affidavit.

Rule 59(c) . No affidavit was filed and so the

grounds must be one or more of the last three alternatives. Rule
59(a) (5) requires a claim that the court's ruling was "given under the
influence of passion or prejudice." No such allegation exists.

Rules

59(a) (6)and (7) require a claim that the evidence was insufficient or
that there is an error in law.

No such allegations exist.

The Plaintiff has simply filed a written version of his final
argument, which argument the trial court did not fully accept, so the
Plaintiff is trying again.

This second try should be rejected.

In the Plaintiff' s Motion, she asks for 13 specific
amendments.

As the following analysis demonstrates, the court was aware

of each argument and no amendment needs to be made:
A.

Motion paragraphs 1, 2, and 10, all deal with the handling of
the Defendant's $20,256.72 IRS debt.

The court was fully

aware of that debt and how the parties handled that debt.
(Memorandum Decision, paragraph 8) . The Plaintiff and
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Defendant were married and the Plaintiff agreed to use her
residence as collateral for the refinancing loan to pay this
debt.

When the home was sold the proceeds were taken and

applied to joint assets and obligations of the parties.
(Memorandum Decision paragraph 14.)

Those assets and

obligations were fully divided by the court after hearing the
Plaintiff's argument at trial.
B.

Motion paragraphs 3 and 11, deal with the Plaintiff's rent
claim.

Although the hotly disputed "written contract" was

fully litigated at trial, it is not specif ically mentioned in
the Memorandum Decision.

The subject matter of the claimed

rent was fully and completely handled by the court.
(Memorandum Decision paragraphs 9 and 10.)

The Plaintiff

raised this argument at trial and it was not persuasive.
C.

Motion paragraphs 4, 5, and 12 deal with encumbrances on the
Sutherland house and Deseret water stock.
fully handled by the court.

Those issues were

(Memorandum Decision paragraph

15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34).

The

Plaintiff did not seek this relief at trial and now wants to
rewrite this portion of the ruling without any basis.
D.

Motion paragraphs 6 and 13 attempt-to get the Defendant to
assume specif ically a debt that was not brought up at trial.
The Memorandum Decision made the Defendant responsible for all
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marital debts.

(Memorandum Decision paragraph 31.)

It is not appropriate to try to add this specific
debt at this time to the Defendant's obligations.
E.

Motion paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and 14 attempt to retry the alimony
and attorney's fee issues. These were major claims of the
Plaintiff at trial. After the court made its property
divisions, the issues of alimony and attorney's fees were
summarily decided.
36.)

(Memorandum Decision paragraphs 35 and

Neither party was employed, although both had held jobs

during the marriage, and both parties had been awarded
substantial assets in the divorce. The court's actions were
within its discretion and no basis for reopening these issues
has been presented.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 59 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. No basis for amending the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce has been presented. The
Plaintiff's motion should be denied.
DATED this

l

day of March,, 1996.

j UJ.^L P

PAUL D. LYMAN
Attorney for Intervenors
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing OBJECTION TO MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCE and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the
19965, addressed as follows:
Mr. Don R. Peterson
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Mr. Eldon A. Eliason
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 605
Delta, Utah 8462

U-y,fc^

day of March,

Matthew Hilton (A3655)
MATTHEW HILTON, PC.
197 South Main Street # 1
P.O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
Telephone: 801-489-1111
Facsimile: 801-489-6000
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—oooOooo—
ELAINE D. BRODERICK,
Plaintiff-Appellee.

: MAILING CERTIFICATE

vs.
BOYD E. BRODERICK,
Defendant-Appellant.

: Civil No. 960775

ALMA L. BRODERICK and
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK,
Intervenors and
Appellants
—oooOooo—
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of June 1997 I placed in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, first class, a copy of the document entitled APPELLANT'S
OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL filed in this case, to the following counsel of record:
Paul D. Lyman, Esq.
835 East 300 North #100
Richfield, UT 84701
1

Don R. Petersen, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
DATED this 24th day of June, 1997.

(jcWclji^Ld>i
Robert Hughes forMatthew Hilton
of Matthew Hilton, P.C.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

On the 24th day of June, 1997, Robert Hughes appeared before me and swore
under oath and penalty of perjury that he had signed the foregoing mailing certificate
and that the statements contained therein were true.
DATED this 24th day of June 1997.

Notary Public
JXSSSffi&E

825 West 2000
Mapleton, Utah
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